Troop Strength = Success?
I'm thinking that this ship has sailed.
Andrew Sullivan hits this a lot, and in the abstract I think he has a case to make - the argument for more troops is valid. But all of my military friends - some of whom are fans of his as well - have said many times that it is an abstract argument. More troops in theatre will shorten the war, yes. More troops in theatre will also increase the casualties. This is the real world trade off. Our greater troop strength helps us kill more bad guys more efficiently, yes, fact. Our greater size and numbers also increases our vulnerabilty to terrorist attack, due to the simple fact that more troops are, in the short run, more targets. This the real-world trade you are making.
You could have a two year war and a six year war that both accomplish the same thing - democratic Iraq. The two-year war costs $600B and 5,000-6,000 U.S. casualties. The six-year war costs $1 trillion and 2,000-3,000 U.S. casualties. "Which 3,000 young American men and women soldiers would you like to have killed to shorten the war, sir?"
250,000 troops on the ground for all of '03 would have been decisive and certainly would have overwhelmed anything Zarqawi or others could have managed to build on, and established security by spring of 04. But not without higher casualties than we have now.
Now, think back - if you enter the equation with no doubt that the war will be won by your side - which is how Rumsfeld and his team certainly did - and you suddenly have your main argument for the war cut out from under you - which Rumsfeld and Co. also did - the one key thing that a general or SecDef must maintain is the trust of the troops that they are 1) not being wasted. And 2) not alone.
While I am quite sure that 250K troops on the ground in April 03 would have put us in good stead today, I'm less certain that a massive 04 or 05 build-up after the WMD fiasco would have been read as the proper response by the troops in the field. Troops understand warfare waste of every kind, which is a main reason why we get so much waste from the Pentagon. But soldiers do not accept the waste of soldiers. We are fighting a long war, and soldiers need to see - apart from politics or abstract thought - that they are valuable to their superiors. If casualties had spiked right after the WMD exposure, the combined effect on the morale would have been harsh. Not to mention how it would have played in the media. Then throw in Abu Graib.
Also, from a troop-morale stand-point (and quite frankly an Iraqi dignity standpoint), we needed to see the Iraqis step up and fight for their country, and so did they. The short war scenario doesn't really allow for this. Iraq would have had their government handed to them by a Western power, and there would have been little dignity in it. I literally ache inside for every innocent that dies in Iraq, and some days it seems overwhelming, but I also feel that the terrorists are losing with every attack. Because the Iraqis are coming to hate them more than we do. The Iraqis don't follow BBC/NYTimes protocol and they call them barbarians and terrorists, they say it on al-Jazeera, and they say it to their friends in the U.S. Army and Marines. This is crucial now - this rapport - due to the WMD failure. U.S. troops want to be noble and seen as noble to those they fight for.
The bottom line here is that while yes, more troops accomplishes certain things, it is also a trade, and one of the most expensive we can make. Time for human lives. Patience is often the most necesary thing in war. The steady hand. I'm not giving the President credit for any of this, mind you. I'm perfectly willing to assess him clueless to most of these issues. I'm saying that I think certain generals have had to come up with certain plans and will carry them out, and that I think Rumsfeld wants to win the war in a demonstrable way. But I am afraid that, for better or for worse, the window of more troops having the effect that many of us, like Andrew, would desire is lost.
Andrew Sullivan hits this a lot, and in the abstract I think he has a case to make - the argument for more troops is valid. But all of my military friends - some of whom are fans of his as well - have said many times that it is an abstract argument. More troops in theatre will shorten the war, yes. More troops in theatre will also increase the casualties. This is the real world trade off. Our greater troop strength helps us kill more bad guys more efficiently, yes, fact. Our greater size and numbers also increases our vulnerabilty to terrorist attack, due to the simple fact that more troops are, in the short run, more targets. This the real-world trade you are making.
You could have a two year war and a six year war that both accomplish the same thing - democratic Iraq. The two-year war costs $600B and 5,000-6,000 U.S. casualties. The six-year war costs $1 trillion and 2,000-3,000 U.S. casualties. "Which 3,000 young American men and women soldiers would you like to have killed to shorten the war, sir?"
250,000 troops on the ground for all of '03 would have been decisive and certainly would have overwhelmed anything Zarqawi or others could have managed to build on, and established security by spring of 04. But not without higher casualties than we have now.
Now, think back - if you enter the equation with no doubt that the war will be won by your side - which is how Rumsfeld and his team certainly did - and you suddenly have your main argument for the war cut out from under you - which Rumsfeld and Co. also did - the one key thing that a general or SecDef must maintain is the trust of the troops that they are 1) not being wasted. And 2) not alone.
While I am quite sure that 250K troops on the ground in April 03 would have put us in good stead today, I'm less certain that a massive 04 or 05 build-up after the WMD fiasco would have been read as the proper response by the troops in the field. Troops understand warfare waste of every kind, which is a main reason why we get so much waste from the Pentagon. But soldiers do not accept the waste of soldiers. We are fighting a long war, and soldiers need to see - apart from politics or abstract thought - that they are valuable to their superiors. If casualties had spiked right after the WMD exposure, the combined effect on the morale would have been harsh. Not to mention how it would have played in the media. Then throw in Abu Graib.
Also, from a troop-morale stand-point (and quite frankly an Iraqi dignity standpoint), we needed to see the Iraqis step up and fight for their country, and so did they. The short war scenario doesn't really allow for this. Iraq would have had their government handed to them by a Western power, and there would have been little dignity in it. I literally ache inside for every innocent that dies in Iraq, and some days it seems overwhelming, but I also feel that the terrorists are losing with every attack. Because the Iraqis are coming to hate them more than we do. The Iraqis don't follow BBC/NYTimes protocol and they call them barbarians and terrorists, they say it on al-Jazeera, and they say it to their friends in the U.S. Army and Marines. This is crucial now - this rapport - due to the WMD failure. U.S. troops want to be noble and seen as noble to those they fight for.
The bottom line here is that while yes, more troops accomplishes certain things, it is also a trade, and one of the most expensive we can make. Time for human lives. Patience is often the most necesary thing in war. The steady hand. I'm not giving the President credit for any of this, mind you. I'm perfectly willing to assess him clueless to most of these issues. I'm saying that I think certain generals have had to come up with certain plans and will carry them out, and that I think Rumsfeld wants to win the war in a demonstrable way. But I am afraid that, for better or for worse, the window of more troops having the effect that many of us, like Andrew, would desire is lost.
posted by JCH | 10:42 AM
16 Comments:
Thanks to andrew for the link.
I couldn't disagree more with your assessment. Casualties actually would drop if we had more troops in Iraq. The COALTION would be able to deal with the problem areas more effectivley instead of having to play "wack a mole" everytime an area like Tal Afur and Mosul get hot. It will also allow us toi finally initiate a counter-insurgency program within the troubloesome Sunni areas. We can execute the ink-blot method much more effectivley and have enough forces on hand to act decisively when needed in these areas if called upon. More combat troops on the ground also will allow to effectively deploy forces at the key spots along the Syrian border and also be available for any necesassary cross-border operations against the safe areas in side of Syria. Remember,the key to all of this is Syria who are Ba'athists and Sunni themselves. It does not serve Syria to allow a democracy to stand up in the region. If it does it will be the beginning of the end for them. The train is moving forward towards demcracy in Iraq, however we are grinding our way to marginal stability due to the influence of Syria and not having enough troops on the ground to truly defeat the enemy and their will to fight.
Again, I think you are arguing from the abstract and not the real world mechanics of the situation. This is not a slam.
Your statement "if we had more troops in Iraq" is itself not wrong. I even agreed with it in my post. The problem is that the process of increasing troop strength in measurable ways is not conducted in a vacuum. New troops brought in are not normally veterans, and even more often not vertans of Iraq. Fighting in Iraq is intense and bloody and something each unit learns better how to do each day, but must be learned on the ground, over time. "more troops on the ground" doesn't just happen. It is a protracted, often difficult process that stretchs from the U.S. to the greenzone. Troops have to be integrated into the working system. This takes time and massive influxes of troops are NOT instantly force multipliers. Again, your statement is not wrong, but neither is it a complete picture. Short term casualties would spike upward during this process.
Further, all of this unphotogenic process is done under the microscruntiny of a presscorps that has little respect for the troops as intelligent, and in truth often feels that their duty is to report in such a way that will shorten the war, even at U.S. expense.
Also, we have absolutely no guarantee that a troop increase would be played in the media as intelligent policy, (even if it is) and considering Bush's recent competency gaffs, it could prove a hard sell with the American public from a President at 38%.
Syria's role is important - as you rightly point out - but again, the increase of troops now, at this stage, would be very difficult to secure politically - and is not a logistical cakewalk either way.
Granted that there are no certainties here, I think the one thing I didn't see addressed in your argument was an acknowledgement that less troops*greater time will not necessarily be as more troops*less time. Certain thresholds can clearly exist in social situations. Without the early stability that 250K+ troops might have provided for a year, you might not ever get on the right course, you can allow an insurgency (or whatever) to gain a level of activity that just can't get put back in a bottle, even with lots of time.
CB makes a good point: do not assume that US casualties will be the same, even if person-years in Iraq are (frankly I think that one is now hard-pressed to make the argument that the war would not have been much shorter had we doubled the troops at the start). At some point, it's entirely possible that more troops will be killed in a longer war with fewer men on the ground, than in a shorter one with many more troops. (Indeed, you could likely make a good argument that that's already true.)
However, let's not overlook total casualties, that is, we should include civilian deaths. Obviously many more Iraqis have been killed than Americans (even excluding enemy fighters). Another 100,000 troops might mean a few hundred more US casualties, but how many fewer Iraqi civilian casualties, especially if we consider deaths due to lack of decent health and sanitary facilities? Surely the military includes this in their calculations.
Also, you have to consider that if more troops are visible enforcing a repressive peace, the greater number of people will feel repressed. So a larger occupying force breeds an equal or greater amount of resentment and resistance (yes, this war could be much, much worse). Sure there have been strategic mistakes prosecuting the war in Iraq, but show me a war where there have been none.
We must remember that this is a regional war and not just centered on Iraq. Failure to do so will cause the COALITION to grind slowly to a very unstable democracy.
Syria, Iran and just about every country in the region are dead set against estabishing a democracy and free market economy in Iraq. A vibrant Iraqi democracy and free market economy will lead to the eventual demise of their theocratic and fascist policies.
Deploying more forces to Iraq will allow the COALITION to more aggressively prosecute the war and train the Iraqi army and establish a strong threatening preence in the region against Syria, Saudi, Kuwait and Iran.
I agree it will be tough politically and logistically to send more troops but wars require tough decisions. However our failure to deal with this war as a regional war will only cause this new Iraq to stand precariously as a democracy.
" You could have a two year war and a six year war that both accomplish the same thing - democratic Iraq. The two-year war costs $600B and 5,000-6,000 U.S. casualties. The six-year war costs $1 trillion and 2,000-3,000 U.S. casualties."
Based on this logic, we still might be fighting WW II – stringing it out to avoid casualties.
The larger and more serious point is that the American people won’t give you six years to win, as Lyndon Johnson discovered. They expect a full out effort concluded in a reasonable period of time. A prolonged campaign of half measures will lose their support and ultimately the war (and the enemy knows this). A six year war in Iraq will mean American defeat, and we will not only have lost Iraq to the Jihadists, but in our domestic politics, we will have lost the military option in the further war on terrorism. Thirty years ago, this post defeat malaise was called the Vietnam syndrome and it lasted until Desert Storm.
The other point is that if America is seen by our enemies to need six years to win against terrorists in Iraq, then they will know that we are not fully engaged in this war, that we have no stomach for it and they can wear us down over time. Telegraphing weakness and indecision to these people is very dangerous – witness Al-Qaeda's increased confidence after our weak responses to their attacks in the 1990’s and their resulting boldness on 9/11. Look, war is chaos and cannot be calibrated like some corporate enterprise (maybe this is why Rumsfeld reminds me so much of Robert McNamara). It must be won quickly, decisively and convincingly to all who are watching – and this involves casualties.
Roger
The bottom line here is that while yes, more troops accomplishes certain things, it is also a trade, and one of the most expensive we can make. Time for human lives.
But I'd say it's not just, "Time for human lives." It's, "Time and Iraqi lives for American soldiers' lives." It's hard to be precise, but in general having more troops on the ground does mean greater security and many fewer civilians dying. And of course I wish that no American soldier would die, but it still seems morally indefensible to trade the lives of Iraqi civilians for American military personnel.
My only point is that the costs should be weighed in terms of logistics (including troop morale, for sure) only. It's seems only honest to keep in mind that morality is strictly against us in this matter, so what we accomplish had better be good.
Mike
Troop levels were reduced after the fall of Saddam because those units involved in the invasion needed rest and recovery. IIRC, only the 3rd Infantry Division remained of the original invasion force. The point is that units need to be relieved before thay burn out, so can a level of 250,000 be maintained for 3 years without impacting other important commitments?
Plus such a deployment would have an negative effect on the size of the stategic reserve. Since we can't know the future, that reserve is important in case of a sudden emergency. Eisenhower got caught without a sufficient reserve by the German Ardennes offensive and the strain on the US Army in reacting to that was quite severe. I guess I'm arguing for a certain amount of stategic prudence.
I think that the roles of Syria and Iran are greatly exaggerrated in order to explain away why we have an insurgency in a country that is supposedly full of liberated liberal democrats (small "l" and small "d") who love the US for what we have done for them.
That there are several factions in Iraq that think in terms of "my tribe vs. everyone else" or "us vs. the foreigners" or that a lot of Sunni Arabs liked having Saddam in power (because they were the ruling class at the time) is a little hard to admit, as much of this war was sold with the idea that the iraqis would immediately fall behind us en masse, and so blaming the insurgency entirely or nearly entirely on foreigners (when it is >90% Iraqi) allows the administration to continue its original narrative.
Moreover, it gives the administration a casus belli if they decide to expand the war.
Conquering Syria or Iran (or alternately, flattening them with bombs) is not likelyto improve the situation in Iraq as much as some people think.
We are not talking about "flattening Syria or Iran" but allowing the COALITION the flexibility to cross into Syria and attack the safe havens that assist the insurgents in Iraq. You can only do that by having more troops on the ground and its not too late to do that. We must fight the enemy not the plan, we must engage these fascists directly with decisive force and defeat them. You cannot separate Ba'athists whether they are Iraqi or Syrian.
Hate to be a party pooper guys, but what troops are we talking about here? Where are they going to come from?
It's always funny to watch armchair strategists argue as if we had unlimited supplies of everything.
Indeed. No small thing.
We can activate 4-5 of the National Guard E Bde's which will give us about 75k worth of troops. Same with the USMC which give us more troops, of course not all of them will deploy to the theater. However we only need about 30k in theater.
Also, it is tough politically but lets make hard decisions because we are in danger of failure especially if we leave too early with out defeating the enemy and building Iraqi troop strength to levels in which they can fight effectivley...Finally I am not an "arm chair strategist," I just returned from a year in theater and working policy and strategy and am a professional military officer with over 24 years of active duty. Thanks
Jason’s point is a good one… Iraq proves we don’t have enough troops for the war on terrorism. The failure here rests with Rumsfeld and Bush, who failed to rearm America after 9/11.
George HW Bush’s ability to fight and win the First Gulf War so decisively was a by-product of the Reagan defense buildup. During the 1980’s, the US built a very capable force to confront the Warsaw Pact in Europe. Saddam Hussein’s army in 1990-91 was a mere shadow of the Warsaw Pact, yet he foolishly choose confrontation with Ronald Reagan’s army on ground more much favorable to US equipment and tactics than Europe.
GW Bush, however, inherited Bill Clinton’s military force, a product of a decade of downsizing. When the Cold War ended in 1992 the Army’s strength was about 772,000. Following the reductions of the 1990’s, the Army was down to 489,000 personnel. The Air Force and Navy suffered comparable reductions.
Bush chose to fight the war on terrorism with Bill Clinton’s army. He never stepped into Reagan’s footprints. He never called upon the nation to send it’s children and it’s taxes to support the reconstruction of the military to the levels necessary to support a high tempo world wide war on terrorism. Bush deferred to Rumsfeld, who took the predictable corporate approach of eschewing people for technology, and arrogantly not recognizing the limits to that approach in an asymmetrical war without boundaries.
Roger
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